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Abstract. The main principles of data security and access organization in the Microsoft Azure cloud storage are considered. A role of hierarchy and access 
keys are presented. We describe the setup and the use of their keys (BYOK) for transparent data encryption (TDE) using Azure Key Vault keyring. 
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CECHY ZARZĄDZANIA KLUCZAMI SZYFROWANIA DANYCH PRZECHOWYWANYCH 
W CHMURZE MS SQL AZURE 
Streszczenie. Uwzględniono główne zasady bezpieczeństwa danych i organizacji dostępu w chmurze Microsoft Azure. Przedstawiono zagadnienia 
hierarchii ról i kluczy dostępu. Zostały opisane dostosowywanie i używanie własnych kluczy (BYOK) do przezroczystego szyfrowania danych (TDE) przy 
użyciu magazynu kluczy platformy Azure. 
Słowa kluczowe: sprzęt komunikacyjny, komunikacja danych, cyberprzestrzeń, transfer danych 
Introduction 
With the spread of the Internet, the technology of data 
processing has undergone significant changes. Previously, a 
computer without any software was just a pile of scrap metal. 
With the appearance of cloud technologies, even a simple mobile 
phone with the access to the Internet can help solve complex tasks. 
Cloud technology is a browser-based mailbox interface with the 
ability to create and edit online office documents, the solution to 
complex mathematical calculations, for which the power of one 
personal computer is not enough. 
Currently the cloud computing technology is one big concept 
that includes many different concepts: software, infrastructure, 
platform, data, and workplace. The most important feature of 
cloud technologies is to meet the needs of users who need remote 
data processing. 
Of course, for an average computer user, cloud-based techno- 
logy is not something you can do nothing without. However, 
cloud computing is essential for business. Its main advantage is 
the ability to save on expensive software. After all, you do not 
have to install expensive office packages and specialized data 
processing software on each computer. In addition, cloud 
computing can allow all employees of the enterprise to use, in 
general, only one operating system, with the access to their 
workplaces through much cheaper terminals. 
However, the concept of cloud technology is a subject to 
considerable criticism. The main drawback is the security, because 
not everyone considers it to be reliable to store personal data on a 
remote server. However, cloud computing has significant 
prospects, since Microsoft, Apple and Google almost 
simultaneously began to implement cloud-based technologies in 
their designs and are not going to abandon them before too long. 
Flexibility, scalability and cost-effectiveness contribute to 
cloud-computing enterprises. This is the answer to the constantly 
changing economic, financial and technical conditions in which 
modern enterprises have to work. Constant changes require new 
ways of thinking, working and doing things. In this new reality, 
the development of a hybrid cloud model is based. Successful 
businesses, from small businesses to multinational corporations, 
recognize the importance of an information system that provides 
secure data access and effective administration. Cloud-based 
systems need to be quickly rebuilt to provide cost-effective 
efficiency with a positive return on investment. This combination 
of requirements is best served by the various IT services offered in 
the hybrid cloud. 
The cloud storage solution for modern applications that 
provides stability, availability and scalability to meet customer 
needs is the MS Azure repository. The Azure repository provides 
many different security features, such as: the storage account can 
be protected by RBAC and Azure Active Directory; the data 
transmitted between the application and Azure can be protected by 
encrypting the client, HTTPS or SMB; automatic data encryption 
can be configured when writing to the Azure repository using the 
"Encrypting the repository" function; for OS drives and data disks 
used in virtual machines, the Azure disk encryption can be 
configured; delegated access to data objects in the Azure 
repository service can be provided with signed URLs; also you 
can use the analytics to track the authentication method used when 
accessing the repository. 
The security features of Microsoft Azure repository include 
storage keys, data encryption during data transfer, inaccessible 
data encryption, and repository analytics. We can protect your 
storage account with role-based access control. Restricting access 
according to security principles (the principle of providing access 
only in those cases and to the extent that knowledge of such 
information will be necessary, as well as the principle of minimum 
rights) is extremely important for organizations that need to apply 
security policies for access to data. These rights are granted by 
assigning an appropriate role to RBAC groups and applications for 
a specific area. We can assign users the rights, for example, the 
rights to a member of the storage account, with the built-in RBAC 
roles. 
The public signature provides delegated access to resources in 
your storage profile. This means that the client can get a limited 
right to work with objects in your storage profile for a certain 
period of time and with a certain set of permissions. We may grant 
these limited rights without notifying access keys to your account. 
To access the repository resources with SAS, client just has to 
pass SAS to the appropriate constructor or method, which contains 
all the information needed to access the authenticated storage 
repository in its query parameters. 
The Azure data repository for data protection includes the use 
of: transport layer encryption for data transfer to or from the 
Azure storage service; SMB 3.0 encryption for Azure file 
resources; client-side encryption, which encrypts the data before 
being transferred to the repository and decrypts it after the data is 
received from the repository service. 
1. Basic principles of security management 
in the Microsoft Azure Data Warehouse 
The main recommendations for protecting and encrypting data 
in Azure include: Multi-Factor Authentication; role-based access 
control (RBAC); encryption of Azure virtual machines; use of 
hardware security models; safe management of workstations; SQL 
data encryption; data protection during transmission; application 
of file-level encryption. 
Verifying the authenticity of the user is the first step in 
providing access to and management of data in Microsoft Azure. 
To do this, the Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) Azure method 
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is used with additional tools other than the user name and 
password. This method helps to protect access to data and 
applications without compromising the user's login process. By 
incorporating Azure MFA for our users, we add a second level of 
security for signing in and transactions. A transaction may refer to 
a document hosted on a file server or in SharePoint Online. Azure 
MFA also minimizes the risk that third parties will be able to 
access data using compromised credentials. Enterprises that do not 
use this additional level of protection are more vulnerable to 
attacks through stealing credentials, which may lead to 
compromising data. 
The main key store solution for Azure services is the Azure 
Key Vault, which provides general key management capabilities. 
Keys are stored by users and services. Azure Key Vault supports 
the creation of user keys or the import of custom keys using the 
scripts used by our encryption keys. 
When implementing encryption of inactive data, several 
encryption keys are used. Asymmetric encryption can be used to 
provide the credentials and authentication necessary for key 
management and access to them. Symmetric encryption is more 
efficient for mass encryption and decryption, which ensures much 
more reliable encryption and better performance. Restricting the 
use of the encryption key reduces the risk of its damage, as well as 
the cost of re-encrypting if it is necessary to replace the key. 
The AES256 (DEK) symmetric key is used to encrypt a 
partition or data block, which may include many sections and 
many data encryption keys. Encrypting each data block with 
another key creates additional complexity for executing attacks on 
encrypted data. When creating a new DEK key, re-encrypting this 
key requires only data in its associated block. 
The Asymmetric Encryption Key (KEK) is used to encrypt 
data keys, the use of which allows you to encrypt the data 
encryption keys directly and manage them. Since KEK keys are 
needed to decrypt the DEK keys, it can actually be considered as 
the single point to control the DEK keys. Data encryption keys 
encrypted using key encryption keys are stored separately, and 
only the entity that has access to key encryption keys may receive 
any encryption key encrypted with the KEK key. 
The client's encryption model is the encryption process that 
we perform with the service program in Azure or an application 
that works in the user's data processing center. When using this 
encryption model, we will receive encrypted data in the form of a 
large binary code without the possibility of decrypting it and also 
without the access to encryption keys. In this model, the keys are 
managed by the appropriate application and this process is opaque 
for the Azure service. 
 
Fig. 1 Model encryption client 
 
Fig. 2. Models for managing encryption keys on the server side 
Server-side encryption models are Azure encryption. In this 
model, we perform encryption and decryption operations. In the 
Azure repository, you can retrieve data using plain text operations, 
and then perform internal encryption and decryption. We may use 
Microsoft encryption keys or our own. 
If you want to encrypt inactive data and manage encryption 
keys, you can use server-side encryption with the help of user-
managed keys in the repository. Some services can store root key 
encryption keys in Azure Key Vault and store the encryption key 
of encrypted data in the internal repository along with the data. In 
this scenario, we can transfer your own keys (BYOK) to the key 
store or create keys to use them to encrypt the desired resources. 
In doing so, we perform encryption and decryption operations 
using the custom key as the root key for all encryption operations. 
When Azure disks are encrypted, the Azure key store is used. 
Thanks to this, we can manage the keys and secrets of disk 
encryption as a part of the key store subscription. Encryption is 
performed for all inactive data on virtual drives in the Azure 
storage service. The Azure key store should be used for key audit 
and policy use. There are many risks associated with the lack of 
suitable secret key protection tools used to encrypt data. If 
intruders have the access to secret keys, they will be able to 
decrypt data and gain access to confidential information. 
To encrypt data stored on disk using a secret key, secure key 
creation, storage, access control and encryption keys are required. 
Although some points may differ, the implementation of inactive 
data encryption can be described using the concepts illustrated in 
the following scheme (see Fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 3. Azure key storage 
Since most attacks are aimed at the user, one of the main 
targets of the attackers is the end point. If the attacker damages the 
end point, they will be able to use user credentials to access the 
organization's data. Most end-to-end attacks occur because users 
are administrators on their local workstations. 
All Azure storage services (BLOB storage, queue storage, 
spreadsheet and Azure file service) support server-side 
inaccessible encryption, and some services support customer-
managed client-side encryption keys. The Azure BLOB storage 
and the Azure file service also support the 2048-bit RSA-
controlled RSA keys in Azure Key Vault. When using client-side 
encryption, data is encrypted and transmitted as an encrypted large 
binary object. 
Currently, the SQL Azure database supports inaccessible data 
encryption in client-side and on Microsoft managed services. 
Server-side encryption support is currently provided using SQL 
functions that implement transparent data encryption. Inactive data 
encryption can be enabled at the database level and at the server 
level. The SQL Azure database supports the client-managed 2048-
bit RSA key in Azure Key Vault. 
Azure role-based access control (RBAC) is used to assign 
users, groups, and access rights within a particular area. A role can 
be a subscription, a group of resources or a separate resource. We 
can assign users rights using the built-in RBAC roles in Azure: the 
role of "Member of the storage account", the role of "Member of 
the classical storage account", the role of "Participant of the 
virtual machine". 
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2. Transparent encryption of data using 
its own key 
Using Your Own Keys (BYOK) for Transparent Data 
Encryption (TDE) allows you to encrypt the database encryption 
key (DEK) using an asymmetric key called protector TDE. With 
TDE keys, we can manage and store data in the Azure Key Vault 
cloud system for managing external keys. The TDE encryption 
key stored on the bootstrap database page is encrypted and 
decrypted with the TDE fuse. The protector TDE is stored in the 
key store of Azure Key Vault. If the server's access to the key 
store is cancelled, it will lose the ability to decrypt and read the 
encrypted database. Protector TDE is configured at the logical 
server level with the inheritance of all databases that are 
associated with this server. 
TDE with BYOK support allows us to provide: higher 
transparency and precision with the ability to independently 
control the TDE fuse; centralized protector's TDE control (with 
other keys and permissions for all other Azure services) due to 
their location in Key Vault; division of responsibilities for 
managing keys and data in an organization; increasing customer 
confidence, as the Key Vault principle does not allow Microsoft 
employees to see or receive encryption keys; key change support. 
 
Fig. 4. The work of TDE with support of BYOK 
When we first set up TDE to use a key logger with Key Vault, 
the server sends Key Vault encryption keys from all databases that 
support TDE to create a key packet request. Key Vault returns the 
encryption key for the encrypted database and this key is stored in 
the user's database. Saved in the Azure Key Vault protector, TDE 
never leaves the Azure Key Vault. A logical server can only send 
key operation requests to the TDE protector key material within 
Key Vault, and never accesses or caches the TDE protector. The 
Key Vault Administrator has the right to revoke Key Vault 
permissions of the server at any point, in which case all 
connections to the server are cut off. 
 
Fig. 5. Setting up a geographic emergency recovery for Azure Key Vault 
The Azure Key Vault can be configured in a variety of ways: 
for a stand-alone database or logical server without geo-
replication; for the database or logical server, configured denial 
handling groups or geo-replicated. At the same time, for each geo-
replicated copy, a local Azure Key Vault is required within the 
refusal group to properly process geographically distributed 
bounces. In the first case, the high level of accessibility for a 
database and logical server without geo-replication can be 
configured by creating two different keystrokes for the server in 
two different regions, which will store the same key material. To 
do this, we create a protector TDE in the primary repository 
located in the same region with the logical server and a clone that 
is a key to the key store in another Azure region. Now the server 
will be able to use a secondary repository if primary problems 
arise during the operation of the database. 
For geo-replicated SQL Azure databases, we create the 
appropriate Azure Key Vault configuration: one source database 
with a repository and one repository database for the repository in 
the same region; there must be at least one and no more than four 
recipient databases; secondary replica databases recipient 
(threading) are not supported. 
For a new deployment of a SQL Server with a geographic 
disaster recovery, we will need to do the following: create two 
logical SQL servers in the same regions that previously created the 
repositories; select the TDE area for the logical server, and then 
for each SQL logical server select AKV in the same region and the 
key that can now be used as the protector of TDE. Each server will 
use a local copy of the protector's TDE. When we perform this 
operation on the portal, we will receive an AppID for the logical 
SQL server that allows you to assign a logical permission from the 
SQL server to access the key repository. After the active geo-
replicate action is performed, the recipient database will be 
created. 
 
Fig. 6. Deploying SQL-Server with geographical disaster recovery using Azure Key 
Vault 
In a script for SQL Geographic Disaster Recovery Database, 
you must create and maintain two Azure Key Vault repositories 
with identical content in the same regions that will be used for 
georeplication of the SQL database before turning on TDE with 
the keys stored in Azure Key Vault and the managed client. 
"Identical Content" here means that both key repositories must 
contain copies of one protector TDE so that both servers have 
access to the protector TDE used for all databases. We 
synchronize both key holders, i.e., we place identical copies of 
protector TDE in them after changing the keys; maintain the old 
versions of the keys that were used for log files or backups; 
preserve the same key properties for all subsequent TDE fuses; 
maintain the same permissions for accessing SQL servers in the 
repositories. 
To restore a backup copy encrypted with a protector TDE 
from Key Vault, you need to make sure that the key is in the 
original repository with the same name. When the protector TDE 
changes for the database, the old database backups are not updated 
to the latest version of the protector TDE. We recommend you to 
keep all older versions of protector TDE in Key Vault to restore 
database backups. Saved backups of logs remain encrypted using 
the original TDE encoder, even if the TDE protector has changed 
and the database already uses the new TDE fuse. Both the key will 
be required to restore the database. If the log file uses a TDE fuse 
stored in the Azure Key Vault, this key will be required during the 
recovery, even if the database is transferred to the TDE fired 
service.  
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Supporting the creation of own keys allows us to 
independently manage the keys for TDE and establish who and 
when can access them. The cloud-based external key management 
system Azure Key Vault has become the first key management 
service in which transparent data encryption is integrated with the 
support for the creation of its own keys. Support for creating your 
own keys allows you to protect the key encryption database 
asymmetric key stored in Key Vault. This asymmetric key never 
leaves Key Vault. If the server has permission to access the key 
repository, the server sends requests for basic key operations in 
the corresponding Key Vault. The asymmetric key is configured at 
the server level and inherited by all databases on that server. 
We can manage such key management tasks as changing a key 
and setting permissions for key repositories. You can also delete 
the keys and enable auditing for all encryption keys. Key Vault 
provides centralized key management and uses strict tracking with 
hardware security modules. Key Vault supports division of key 
management tasks and data to ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements. 
For operations within Azure, the database does not need to be 
decrypted. The TDE parameters are transmitted transparently from 
the source database to the recipient database. This applies to all 
the following operations: heavens; recovery at a certain point in 
time through the self-service interface; restore of a remote 
database; active geo-replication; creation of a copy of the 
database. 
To configure TDE on the Azure portal, we connect on behalf 
of the owner, member, or SQL Azure security administrator. 
Transparent data encryption is configurable at the database level. 
To include TDE in the database, we enter the Azure portal with an 
administrator account or a member of Azure. The settings for 
transparent data encryption are displayed in the database user 
information section. By default, it is managed by a transparent 
data encryption service. For a server that has a database, the TDE 
certificate is created automatically. 
 
Fig. 7. Set up the protector TDE on the Azure portal 
The primary key of transparent data encryption (also called 
transparent data protection protector) is set at the server level. To 
use TDE to support our own keys creation and to protect databases 
using the key stored in Key Vault, we use TDE parameters for our 
server. 
Thanks to BYOK support, users can independently manage 
their keys and perform operations such as changing keys, setting 
keys per key retention, removing keys, turning on audits and 
reporting through all protectors’ TDE through Azure Key Vault. 
Key Vault supports centralized key management, utilizes carefully 
crafted hardware security modules (HSM), and allows you to 
share key management and data management responsibilities to 
ensure compliance with legal requirements. 
Conclusion 
A complete solution for encrypting inactive data assumes that 
data is never stored in unencrypted form. During use, when the 
server loads data into memory, data can be stored locally in a 
variety of ways, including the Windows paging file, a crash dump, 
and logging that the application can perform. To ensure that this 
data is encrypted during storage, IaaS applications can use Azure 
Disk Encryption on the Windows Azure IaaS virtual machine and 
virtual disk. 
In IaaS applications, we often have to encrypt Azure disks and 
inactive data encryption settings provided by any Azure service 
used. In some cases, such as with non-standard encryption 
requirements or using non-Azure storage, the IaaS application 
developer may need to implement inactive data encryption on its 
own. IaaS solution developers can provide better integration with 
Azure management and meet user expectations by using specific 
components of Azure. We use the Azure Key Vault service to 
provide secure key storage and to provide our users with 
consistent key management options for most of the services of the 
Azure platform. In addition, our solutions must use the credentials 
of Azure-managed services to provide service accounts with 
access to encryption keys. 
Protecting user data stored in Azure services is of particular 
importance to Microsoft. All services hosted in Azure are 
committed to providing inactive data encryption options. Basic 
services, such as Azure storage, Azure SQL Database and key 
analytics services already provide inactive data encryption 
options. Some of these services support user-managed keys and 
client-side encryption, as well as service-managed keys and 
encryption. Microsoft Azure services are constantly improving the 
availability of inactive data encryption, and new parameters will 
appear in the preliminary and public versions in the near future. 
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